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APPENDIX A TO FR 85

SECRET

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APPENDIX A

ABTEILUNG VI C 4 (FAR EAST) RSHA

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1. General

The work of Abt VI C 4 was the collection and evaluation of info and the subsequent publication of regular monthly and occasional intermediate reports on Far Eastern political and economic questions.

Until 1944 this work was performed by a small staff which, with one exception, lacked the necessary linguistic qualifications and background knowledge of the FAR EAST. With the sudden increase of interest in matters concerning the FAR EAST in autumn 44, WEIRAUCH, head of Abt VI C 4, enlisted the services of a number of persons, chosen for their intimate or general knowledge of the FAR EAST, amongst whom was Prisoner.

What prompted Amt VI to evince this greater interest in the FAR EAST and to expand accordingly, Prisoner does not know. Being unaware of the existence of a revoked Führer order to refrain from int activities viv-à-vis the Japanese ally, he advances two theories as motives for rising interest and intensification of production.

- a) The course of events in the FAR EAST and Japanese reaction to them may have called for a closer scrutiny, born of a growing distrust, in view of the rapid worsening of GERMANY's military situation.
- b) Personal considerations on the part of SCHELLERBERG, who was possibly intending to provide himself with a staff of FAR EAST experts in case of his appointment to the post of Foreign Minister, may have been instrumental in enlarging the Abt. It was well known that SCHELLERBERG opposed the foreign policy of von RIBBENTROP and that he himself hoped to secure this appointment.

Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that in autumn 44, the material submitted by Abt VI C 4 to higher levels appears to have been considered inadequate and the need for more detailed and accurate info was felt.

2. Personnel of Abt VI C 4

Prisoner is ignorant of the original organization of the Abt, and of any subsequent changes prior to his arrival. He joined together with WILCKERLING early in Oct 44 and found WEIRAUCH with his two assistants, Dr LEO and HEYER. In addition there were two secretaries, Fräulein REITEL and Fräulein Edith (surname not known). Shortly afterwards and in the sequence mentioned KLINGERBERG, Dr KIESEL and Fräulein WEINERT took up duties. The secretarial staff was increased by Fräulein ZOELL and Fräulein SOMMER. In Mar 45 a police secretary joined on the day when part of the Abt was evacuated to ALKTHEDWITZ. His name is not known.

The following were the officials of Abt VI C 4, which was subordinate to Gruppe VI C of Amt VI:-

TSCHERSKY  
~~WOLFGANG TSCHERSKY~~

Was head of Gruppe VI C, remaining only a short while (Dec 44) after Prisoner entered the Abt. He showed little interest in the Abt.

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WMP

Originally Abw, succeeded TSCHERSKY. He left the Abt to its own devices, not from any disinterest, but because he was actively engaged in the work of other Abts of his Gruppe, especially Abt VI C 2 (RUSSL).

WEIRAUCH, Peter

SS Stubaf and Reg Rat. Is believed by Prisoner to have been head of the Abt since its inception. Before his staff was increased, he tried, unsuccessfully, to offset the deficiency of suitable personnel by sheer hard work. With the new plan of expansion he had optimistic visions of a vast network of V- and I-men and Agents under the sole control of his Abt. He left in Nov/Dec 44; rumour had it that he was removed from office for inefficiency. Nominally he was appointed LO between Amt VI and Army Gp SOUTH, in which capacity he was to do six months service at the front, before being promoted to Ostubaf and Ob Reg Rat. He was then to return to the Abt, and Prisoner deputised for him during his absence.

LEO, Dr Joern

Was with the Abt from 1942 or 1943. The outbreak of war between GERMANY and RUSSIA had prevented his return to JAPAN, where he was manager of the propaganda dept of the German State Railways. He had an extensive knowledge of Japanese internal affairs and personalities, having spent many years there; he was a graduate of a Japanese University. He speaks and writes Japanese fluently.

KIRFEL, Dr Harald

Came from Lehr Regt KILFURST after a short course. Before that he was instructor in Japanese at the OKW Interpreter School. A doctor of languages, he speaks fluent Japanese and reads and writes Chinese, although he has never been to the FAR EAST. He became very enthusiastic about his work in the Abt, and, deciding to make it his career, he took the necessary steps with the personnel branch of Amt VI shortly before the collapse.

FR. WEINERT

Was employed at the request of KIRFEL with whom she was friendly. She speaks and writes Japanese.

MEYER

Prisoner knows little of him as, soon after his arrival, MEYER was transferred to BRATISLAVA. In the Abt he had been responsible for Indo-Chinese agents, a task which was taken over by KIRFEL.

WILCKERLING, Rolf

Had some slight knowledge of the FAR EAST, having been employed by a bookseller in SHANGHAI. He proved to be of little value and was attached as LO to WEINERT, the representative of Amt VI in HAMBURG, towards end Jan 45. From that time onwards nothing was heard of him.

KLINGEBERG, Werner

An employee of the DNB, engaged by WEIRAUCH on LEO's suggestion, as it was thought that he had good connections with the Japanese colony and leading Japanese personalities in GERMANY, having established some contacts during the occasion of his stay in JAPAN as a delegate of the German Olympic Games Committee.

Frl Edith ?

Secretary to Dr LEO.

Frl ZOEBEL and  
~~Frl SOMMER~~

Secretaries to the other members of the Abt.

Police Secretary

He was intended for the registry and filing section and left for MARXBED. ITZ the day he joined. Prisoner remembers him as an East Prussian, self-taught in Russian and Japanese, of which his knowledge was imperfect.

Thus, in spite of the infusion of new blood, only four people in Abt VI C 4 had the required background, viz Prisoner, LEO, KIRFEL and WEINERT. Their qualifications were a command of the language and a knowledge of Far Eastern questions, ranging from sound to fair. The general attitude can also be described as more pro- than anti-Japanese, which, in the opinion of Prisoner, was a definite disadvantage. Their training was academic and what was lacking in experience of work was made up in enthusiasm, kindled by the prospects of getting missions to the FAR EAST.

3. Ant VI/Amt Mil

For purely military matters relating to the FAR EAST Abt VI C 4 had its counterpart in Amt Mil with the nomenclature of either Mil C 4, Mil CO or Mil CFO. At its head was Obstlt OHLITZ and other offrs with whom Prisoner came in contact were Maj BAECHTLE and, in particular, Hptm Dr PLAGE and Fw BRENNSCHEIDT.

Hptm PLAGE

A doctor of law, had lived 8 - 10 years in TOKYO, making a name for himself in the safeguarding of German patents, licences and copyrights and preventing their violation. He was Amt Mil IO to the Japanese military and naval attachés.

Fw BRENNSCHEIDT

A former merchant from CHINA; handled AST SHANGHAI material at the BELZIG WT stn.

Prisoner stresses that, to all appearances, liaison and co-operation between the two Abts was very good.

4. Programme and Duties

As in 1944 Abt VI C 4 had no direct sources of info from the FAR EAST, in order to function successfully the primary need was the creation of its own network of informers, abroad and at home, when Prisoner entered the Abt.

Considering the war situation in autumn 44, the overseas projects, which never passed beyond the planning stage, were courageous and optimistic. They included the purchase of an Italian transmitter in PEKING; the despatch of KIRFEL to SOUTH CHINA or NANKING, where he was to set up his own network of V-men and agents; the despatch of WILCKERLING to the DUTCH EAST INDIES with the same mission. In this atmosphere of idealistic planning with total disregard for the difficulties of communications, even WEIRAUCH and LEO had visions of going to the FAR EAST, the former as a Police Attaché and the latter to MONGOLIA. For specially trained men they were to rely on the personnel from an Abwehrakademie which SCHILLERBERG wanted to found in order to ensure a steady flow of trained recruits. The outcome of all these projects was the try of two Indo-Chinese semi-agents at the WT school of the HAVEL Institute of the RSKA.

There still remained the recruiting of V-men and agents in GERMANY for the purpose of increasing the quantity of incoming direct info. The problem was tackled after 1944 and was as great a fiasco as the overseas project. All members of the Abt with social or other contacts and

Recruited was not impressive, and though there was now quantity in incoming infm, it lacked the quality. The main feature of V-reports was gossip, Prisoner voices the opinion that, from the outset, the combined efforts of the personnel of Abt VI C 4 were too amateurish and remained so to the end.

As to the duties of individual members in Abt VI C 4 there was more a pooling of tasks than a strict allocation of work, since Referate did not exist. However, later a crystallization of defined functions became apparent.

After MEIRAUCH left, Prisoner was assigned the task of producing the monthly and intermediate reports, wherein he was assisted with evaluation and preparatory drafts by LEO and also with sifting of daily reports and their collation by Fr EDLERT. LEO also handled scientific analyses and liaison with the Press, being assisted by KLINGBERG. ✓

KIRFEL dealt with the collection of infm from V- and I-persons and agents; in addition, he was responsible for the Indo-Chinese agents, having taken over these duties from MEYER. He was assisted by WILGERLING after the latter had organised a registry and filing section which did not exist before Oct 44; the only documentary matter had been a card-index of Far Eastern personalities in GERMANY and abroad.

#### 5. Situation Reports and their Distribution

Int collected by Abt VI C 4 was embodied in a monthly situation report in two parts, military and political.

The military part dealt with the Far Eastern theatres of war regionally: CHINA, BURMA, the PACIFIC, and Sea and Air. The subjects were treated objectively on a broad basis and the infm was confined to facts, without including strategical considerations or tactical details. In the last report, published in Mar 45 for the month of Feb, the Japanese situation was described as hopeless, if no compromise with the opponents were possible.

The political part contained regularly an appreciation of relations between JAPAN and USA, JAPAN and RUSSIA, JAPAN and CHUNGKING-CHINA, as well as a review of the internal Japanese situation. The critical nature of the situation was stressed without prejudice, although, with the non-renewal of the Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact, it was wrongly appreciated that a weakened but still active JAPAN was of more interest to RUSSIA as an ally against the USA than a totally defeated JAPAN. Later events showed this view, a product of wishful thinking, to have been completely erroneous.

Of intermediate reports a total of four was published on the following subjects:

WANG CHING-WEI and the choice of a successor;  
Gen UGAKI and peace feelers towards CHUNGKING CHINA;  
CHIANG KAI-SHEK and YENIN Communists;  
Cabinet Changes in Japan.

The reports, the quality of which had improved with a more expert presentation, were classified as "most secret" and, according to regulations, typewritten and numbered copies were distributed against signature to:-

SCHILLENBERG whose copy was later submitted to  
KALTENBRUNNER and HEIDLER, and possibly  
to HITLER;

RAPP whose copy was circulated for perusal to  
all heads of Gruppen in Abt VI and then  
returned to him;

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O. W. Amt Ausl;  
Zentral Büro Amt VI for Dr Giseler WIRSING;

One copy was filed with Amt VI C 4.

SCHLEIBERBERG gave instructions for the issue of a copy to the Foreign Office, which occurred only once during the whole period of Prisoner's employment in the Amt. Dr BRAUN was shown reports confidentially, but their text was nothing new to him.

Whilst no forecasts were demanded and, in fact, on orders from SCHLEIBERBERG, were not to be attempted, Dr WIRSING (Prisoner at GEDIC (LA)), of the Zentral Büro Amt VI (originally Gruppe VI A) consolidated all monthly regional reports of the Gruppen into a world political situation report. These were known as "EXMONT" reports, and were documents of a top secret nature for distribution to the highest levels only. They did not circulate in Amt VI officially, but WIRSING permitted their perusal to a few members. Prisoner read some of the "EXMONT" reports and was surprised at their candour about the precariousness of the German situation. In one of them peace with the Western Allies was strongly advocated if anything were still to be salvaged from the wreck. The reports were full of undisguised criticism of HITLER's foreign policy; in one of the last reports it was proposed that the Vatican should be asked to act as an intermediary in peace negotiations between GERMANY and the Western Powers.

#### 6. Dissolution of Amt VI C 4

As a result of the increasing air raids on BERLIN, the Amt moved from the Berkauerstr. in BERLIN/SCHNIGGENDORF to the WILHELMSTR., where it occupied the building which also housed the staff of UNTERSEKRETAR Z of Amt C 2. This was in Feb 45. Amt VI C 4 ceased to function as a proper unit when evacuation measures were accelerated in Mar 45. Dr LEO with Fräulein Edith ? and the newly arrived police secretary went to MARKTREDWITZ. KIRFEL, KLINGBERG and Fräulein WILHELM went to BAD GASTELN to remain in contact with the Japanese Embassy, which had been evacuated to that place. They were joined later by two V-persons or agents, formerly employed by Amt VI C 2 (RUSSIA), one an Estonian woman with the Christian name of Ilona, and the other a German woman, who were sent there by order of RAPP. Fräulein ZOBEL went to FRANKFURT/MAIN with a departmental recommendation to the local Postal Conscription Office. Fräulein KETTEL was taken over by Amt VI C 3 (NEAR EAST). Fräulein SOMMER, although advised to join her family in WUNTERSBERG or to go to MARKTREDWITZ, preferred to remain in BERLIN. Thus Prisoner was the only member of Amt VI C 4 left in BERLIN. ✓

On 21 Apr 45 orders were received to destroy all documents and files, which was done in the courtyard of Berkauerstr. In this connection Prisoner learned from RAPP that a similar order had gone out to MARKTREDWITZ a few days previously. On the same day, with the state of affairs verging on chaos, Prisoner was told to be prepared for a flight from BERLIN. The same evening, under RAPP's leadership, some fifteen cars left the capital in a northerly direction, but without definite destination. Prisoner recalls the presence of the following members of Amt VI in the convoy:

Dr SCHMITZ (Personal Referent to SCHLEIBERBERG);  
Hptstuf SCHMIDTNOFF;  
Dr SCHOLM (Oberfeldrichter) and  
Oblt Dr SCHUTZ.

Because of low-level air attacks the convoy travelled by night via SCHERIN and LÜBCK to TIEBERDORFER STRAND, where they arrived on 1 or 2 May 45.

At TIEBERDORFER STRAND it was learned that HITLER had committed suicide and that DÖNITZ was head of the newly formed Govt in FLENSBURG. This news

7. Appreciation of Output of Abt VI C 4

When interrogated at length on the actual int output of Abt VI C 4, Prisoner stated that its work was overrated. As regards providing first-class info to higher levels, the handicap under which the Abt laboured was too great to be outweighed by enthusiasm. Nothing produced had the nature of a scoop, as there was no outstanding source of info.

Prisoner believes that better monthly reports could have been published by the Foreign Office, where he presumes more int material was available, as it was never fully established whether Dr BRAUN imparted to Abt VI C 4 everything he knew. Info from V- and I- sources in GERMANY was valueless and Prisoner contends that nothing obtained through these channels was ever incorporated in a report.

Because exports prepared and published the reports, stylistic improvement was apparent from Oct 44. As to contents, they constituted general material on Far Eastern events, military and political, but no more. The difference between a Foreign Office report and one packed with secret and reliable int, as those of the Abt should have been, did not exist. Too young, lacking the necessary resources and with its plans of expansion overshadowed by impending defeat, Abt VI C 4 was too hampered to perform successfully what had been envisaged.